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OPEN SOURCE LICENSING AND
SCATTERING OPPORTUNISM IN
SOFTWARE STANDARDS
GREG R. VETTER *
Abstract: Despite their beneficial influence on interoperability and
markets, problems of detrimental opportunism occur with technology
standards, including standards implemented in software, which this Ar-
ticle calls "Software Standards." inspired by new perspectives on the
study of semicommons in the history of real property, this Article Con-
templates the substitutability of free and open source software ("FOSS")
for traditional standard-setting approaches. Standards are analogous to
semicommons, where public and private use interact, raising the possi-
bility of opportunistic influence on the Software Standard to increase
private gain at the expense of the public benefit in a more uniform
standard. With its source code disclosure requirement, FOSS shifts and
dampens this opportunism, although various limits influence the reach
of its effect. The political economy around a standard will express itself
differently under a FOSS implementation, and clearing intellectual
property rights in the standard is no more certain than under the tradi-
tional standard-setting approach.
INTRODUCTION
Technology standards are indispensable to the modern world,
but they come with the risk of strategic and opportunistic behavior by
those involved in creating the standard and implementing products
that conform to it. Standards provide both public and private benefit.
This division enables counterproductive opportunism, which involves
private gain at the expense of a more ubiquitous or uniformly imple-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center (UHLC); Co-Director,
Institute for Intellectual Property and Inikirmation Law; biography available at www.law.
uh.edu/faculty/petter. My background includes a master's degree in computer science
and nine years of full-time work experience in the software industry. sly thanks to UHLC
students Stacey Reese, Jeffrey Toni, and divine Zakhari for research assistance. For helpful
comments and discussion, I thank Darren Rush, Craig Joyce, and participants at the Own-
ing Standards symposium held in March 2006 and sponsored by the Roston College Law
Review, particularly Miclutel Carroll, who moderated the open source panel at the sympo-
sium.
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mented standard. Thus, opportunistic behavior seeks private gain at
the expense of the public benefit in the standard. Such opportunism
can occur during creation of the standard, and also post-creation, as
suppliers implement the standard. It can involve skewing the standard
to a firm's particular capabilities or can involve proprietary intellec-
tual property rights in the standard. Dampening such opportunism is
a policy concern for standard creation, revision, and implementation.
A typical response to dampen opportunism is norm enforcement,
where a community or authority enlbrces practices that inhibit coun-
terproductive opportunism. For standards implemented in software,
which this Article calls "Software Standards," lessons from the semi-
commons in the history of real property suggest an alternative ap-
proach—technological "boundary" rearrangement. 1 Software Standards
are a type of technology semicommons. A beneficial technological
boundary rearrangement may inherently occur in this semicommons
if Software Standards are implemented as free and open source soft-
ware ("FOSS" ). 2 This potential occurrence suggests the potential sub-
stitutability of FOSS for the approach of traditional standard-develop
men t organizations ("SDOs").
The historical semicommons referenced above is the open fields
system in England.'' Under this system, each landowner held scat-
tered, irregular-shaped strips of land. Aggregately, the strips were
See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
2 This Article accepts as a premise, without claiming that it is fully demonstrated, that
the FOSS licensing system works well enough to support the live primary conditions this
Article uses to give meaning to the FOSS label: (1) royalty-free software use; (2) available
with source code; (3) distributable in modified or unmodified fOrm; (4) with recipient
users and redistributors graitting a patent license to other recipients for patents controlled
by the recipient that cover the software; and (5) with all these conditions applying to fu-
ture generations of the software upon redistribution with or without modification, includ-
ing modifications that intermix other software. There are various issues of' doctrine that
arc not well-settled with FOSS licensing. See David McGowan, Legal implications of Open-
Source Stliware, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 281,1-302 (discussing doctrinal issues related to a
variety of matters, including assent, privity, term, termination, and assignment). Some
FOSS licenses include additional patent provisions, extending the treatment beyond con-
dition four in the list above by eliminating . or suspending a recipient's right to use the
software if the recipient asserts patents against the software. These are sometimes called
"patent peace" clauses.
My definition of FOSS licensing excludes attribution-only licenses. Tints, I fricus on
what some call "copyleft" FOSS. Attribution-only licenses are sometimes called 85D-style
licenses. They generally allow any use of the software, even in proprietary products without
source code, so long as attribution is given. Finally, unless a license is named, this Article
dues not intend to single out any specific license. FOSS licensing is taken as a system de-
tined by the five conditions above.
9
 See infra notes 43-47 :tncl accompanying text.
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productive on a public scale as a commons for grazing, but individu-
ally their private use was agricultural. This boundary 'manipulation or
ownership into strips was theorized to decrease the opportunistic pos-
sibility for any individual landowner to gain to the detriment of the
others' use or the public use of the land. 4 During certain periods, the
historical semicommons favored boundary rearrangement over norm
enforcement to inhibit opportunism.
As technological semicommons, SDOs often adopt norms to gov-
ern their activities. Positive law, such as antitrust, also applies to SDOs.
Norm enforcement may cover procedures for deliberation and deci-
sion making to allow SDO participants to check each other, or it could
cover practices to clear intellectual property rights involved with the
standard. The SDO approach to inhibiting opportunism is synonymous
with norm enforcement.
When promulgating a Software Standard, SDOs typically issue pub-
lic documents describing the standard. Companies often implement
the standard in private code, however, using a proprietary approach to
software licensing that keeps source code secret and distributes only
object code. The SDO approach facilitates secret implementation,
which in turn facilitates opportunism. 5
Like SDOs, FOSS development needs to inhibit counterproduc-
tive opportunism and clear intellectual property rights for use of the
software. SDOs and FOSS have overlapping approaches to inhibiting
opportunism, with similarities and differences. FOSS licenses require
a fully public implementation because the software must disclose
source code, and not just provide object code, among other impor-
tant conditions.
This Article proposes the potential substitutability of a FOSS peer
production process"; for the SDO approach to Software Standards.
This change is akin to replacing norm enforcement with scattered
strips of property in the historical semicommons example. The FOSS
approach provides technological boundary rearrangement under its
license conditions that require freely redistributable source code for
successive generations of the software. In other words, FOSS could
4 See Henry E. Smith„S'emicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 291
LEGAL. STUD. 131,162-65 (2000).
5 See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
See Yochai Benklec Goose's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YA1J L.J.
309, 372-78 (2002) (discussing a generalized production theory of aggregating creative
inputs consistent with and inspired by FOSS).
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function as a "direct to code" standard. This is similar to what the re-
sult would be if a FOSS product became a de facto standard.
A complex inquiry then emerges: what conditions would be con-
ducive for an SDO to promulgate a Software Standard directly as
FOSS code? To analyze this question, Part I discusses intangible own-
ership in standards, as well as creation-process and implementation
opportunism with Software Standards.?
Part It examines norm enforcement for SDOs and FOSS. 8 Al-
though a variety of norm examples exists for SDOs, this Article uses
the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004
(the "SDOAA" or "Act") to focus the inquiry.'" The SDOAA limits anti-
trust liability in certain ways for an SDO "while engaged in a standards
development activity."'U To qualify for this protection, the SDO must
run a consensus process." Thus, the enforcement pressure is through
an antitrust law benefit. FOSS norms are enforced through the li-
cense and through a potent ideology coupled with software commu-
nity practices.
Part III presents the SDO and FOSS approaches to Software Stan-
dards. 12
 FOSS's royalty-free source code disclosure requirement brings
a different mix of benefits and costs to the initial and downstream de-
velopers and users. It induces an opportunity cost for participants in
foregone potential For some private-code economic rents. Comparing
this situation to the semicommons of a standard, one sees that the new
7 See ir0/1 notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
9
 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 44101-108, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (Stipp. IV 2004).
§ 4302(2). The SDOAA (1) de-trebles damages for SDOs that file an identifying
notification with the federal giwernotent disclosing the nature and scope of activities to
deveh p or promulgate a voluntary consensus standard, (2) requires a rule of reason at tidy-
sis for SDOs, and (3) shifts attorney lees. Id. §§ 430214305.
Following an Office of Management and Budget Circular referenced by the SDOAA,
this Article uses the term "consensus standard" fur the  n 11)111 of voluntary, open organiza-
tions with inclusive processes. OFFICE OE MGMT. & BUDGEE, EXECUTIVE: OFFICE 01."EllE
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-119, FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN 'rim DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF
VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES § 4 (1998)
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR], available at http://lmwwhitehouse.gov/omh/circulars/
a 1 19/a 1 19.1mul.
l'artieularly in information iechnology, there is an increasing use of consortia as an al-
ternative to the consensus approach. Consortia differ from consensus SDOs in a variety of
ways, including a willingness to use expedited process rather titan the intricate rules of the
consensus organizations. Carl F. Cargill, The Sisyphus Agenda: Standatykation as a Guanlian
of Innovation, in THE STANDARDS EDGE: DYNAMIC TENSION 31, 34-35 (Sherrie Bolin ed.,
2004).
12 See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
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FOSS boundary diminishes opportunities for private gain at the ex-
pense of the common good under the theory that FOSS facilitates
greater adoption of a more uniform and uniformly implemented stan-
dard. The toll for crossing the boundary into the standard when intan-
gible rights are involved is reduced from the SDO's oft-used reasonable
and nondiscriminatory ("RAND") royalty to the FOSS decentralized
royalty-free approach, with a corresponding reduction in affiliated
transaction costs. Shareable FOSS code might reduce duplicated efforts
to implement the standard. On the other hand, the FOSS approach
might affect standard adoption rates if participants wait for someone
else to implement the shareable code. Moreover, the FOSS license
might need specific provisions for use in the standards context so that
participants do not fear a requirement to disclose product source code
or over-commit patent rights. If nothing assuages these concerns, the
FOSS approach might attract a smaller participant group, potentially
bringing a corresponding reduction in the intangible rights cleared for
the standard.
Also important are comparative fragmentation possibilities. Pri-
vate parties sometimes try strategically to extend or customize a stan-
dard, perhaps increasing its technical features, but at the expense of
uniformity. The FOSS fragmentation problem is called "forking,"
which has the potential to cause related problems, but differs in that
distributed forked FOSS code can be used by anyone to gain whatever
advantages may exist in the forked implementation. Thus, fragmenta-
tion of FOSS code may not inevitably lead to a permanent schism in
the standard and may allow an easier escape from a suboptimal equi-
librium with the technology.
In conclusion, this Article emphasizes the implications for future
standards development. Often, a standard can be partitioned from
another layer of technology and implemented as working software.
When this is so, the FOSS approach should be considered as an alter-
native to the traditional standards-development process.
I. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR WITH SOFTWARE STANDARDS
Standards present problems of moral hazard. The incentives to
game the creation process to lock in competitive advantage are in ten-
sion with the goal of creating a viable, widely adopted standard. Even
after origination, a variety of strategic behaviors regarding the stan-
dard may advance one implementer's competitive position at the ex-
pense of the common benefits underlying standardization. Some of
these opportunistic tendencies are exacerbated with Software Stan-
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dards. After reviewing the question of intellectual property ownership
in a standard, this Part discusses the opportunism scenarios to illus-
trate the need for countervailing forces to inhibit them.
A. Intangible Ownership and the Dichotomy of Standards
Ownership rules for a standard and its implementations depend
on the standard's creation process. A de facto standard IS may bring
private ownership to the entity or entities-that develop the product or
platform. A de jure standard developed ender a consensus process
may reduce control from intellectual property-based ownership rules.
Standards involving either category may induce firms to pool rights to
intangibles, such as patents, in order to reduce infringement risk
through cross-licensing. For all of these examples, this Article uses the
term "ownership rules" broadly to include licensing conditions for the
standard or its implementations.
Unless something governs the input rights and the rights created
or contributed during the standard creation process, these rights
leave open the possibility for property-like control over the stall-
dard. 14 The typical rights at issue arise from trade secret, trademark,
copyright, and patent law. Rights owners may have the opportunity to
exclude use of the standard through exclusionary rights and control
its disposition. The strongest instance of this is often a de facto stan-
dard, one example being Microsoft's Windows operating system for
desktop computing. But even a de jure standard developed through a
participatory consensus process may retain property-like features,
such as, for example, requiring payment for use under RAND terms.''
" Delineating precisely when standards are de facto versus de jure is not central to toy
analysis. An additional point for software-iniplemented standards is that they are often
layered: it de facto standard may depend on a de jute standard which may incorporate
elements of other de facto standards, and so on. As a definitional matter, de facto stan-
dards are those that are not de jure, but de jure standards are harder to cabin. They may
flow directly front governmental authority, quasi-governmental entities, or organizations
whose output is approved or incorporated by the government in some way. See Mark A.
Lentley, !Welk:dual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L Rev. 1889,
1898 (2002); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.I. 623,633-34 (2002).
14 If there are patents existing prior to the standard but not discovered during the
creation process, there is also the possibility of post-creation control over the standard by
third parties not involved in its creation. If non-participant patents surface during stan-
dard creation, the participants could seek a license or direct the standard away from the
patented tecloudogy.
15 Joseph Scott
	
IP Policy as Governance Structure: A Fresh Look at the RANI)
Promise 4-6 ( Jan. 10,2006) (nu published manuscript, on file with author).
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•	 RAND licensing is a liability-rules approach often used for de jure
or consensus standards. It illustrates standards' function to provide
both public and private benefits. Under an optimistic view, the SDO
participants anticipate that collaboration will pay off in a novel tech-
nology platform generating new opportunities for the participants and
third parties, despite the potential for induced limitations on appropri-
ability for any intangible assets contributed to the standard. 16 Under a
pessimistic view, intellectual property rights may underpin opportunism
by SDO participants during standard creation and thereafter, even if
the RAND licensing promise is made.
Ideally, participants clear their own intellectual property rights
against the standard. This does not eliminate, however, the possibility
that third parties, in particular those holding patents, will not have
leverage over the standard through their own intellectual property
rights. Independent development after the patent issues is not a de-
fense to infringement. Thus, third party patent-holders may threaten
both de facto and de jure standards.
FOSS licensing is a hybrid of the various ideas discussed in this
Section. It spans the classic division of de facto versus de jure stan-
dards. FOSS, such as the Linux kernel or its license, the General Pub-
lic License (the "GPL"), may achieve de facto standard status. FOSS
developers often interact over code and its licensing, in ways similar to
participants of SDOs, hoping to spawn de jure, consensus, or consor-
tia-based standards. Consortia SDOs, with less intricate and open pro-
cedures than consensus processes, would fall somewhere between
consensus SDOs and FOSS if one arrayed these on a continuum. 17
FOSS licensing began as a copyright cross-licensing scheme with con-
ditions applying upon a distribution, but has expanded to include
patent licenses granted to recipient-users of the software by those who
distribute it. Like a typical SDO, a FOSS group wants a license that
clears intellectual property rights to the greatest extent possible to
facilitate maximum spread of the software.
16 Id. Historically, the SDO arrangement created opportunities for strategic behavior.
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HAM-MOOR ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STAN-
DARDS SETTING 14-19,56-67 (2004) [hereinafter ANTITRUST HA:santookl. Related to this
history is the fact that scholars have critiqued the methods by which SDOs disgorge and
clear intangible rights kir the inputs and license the standard for use post-creation. See
Lemley, supra note 13, at 1904-06 (reviewing the intellectual property policies of various
SDOs).
17 See Cargill, supra note 11, at 33-36.
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B. Creation Process Opportunism
SDOs are participatory affiliations. This underpins their occa-
sional claim to de. jure status for their output, especially when Operat-
ing at the consensus end of the continuum that runs from consensus
processes, with their inn participatory approach and decisions by vot-
ing, to consortia, which often have closed membership and less for-
mai processes. 18
 Regardless of the cooperative approach employed, an
SDO's role is to facilitate agreement.
Thus, an SDO devising or revising a standard must aggregate par-
ticipants' technical preferences. These ostensibly technical prefer-
ences may harbor participants' competitive strategies. This preference
aggregation process is subject to public choice theory's litany of cri-
tiques, such as the influence of agenda-setting power, decisional con-
straints, incentives to shirk participation, factional interests, and vote
trading. This list relates to opportunism concerns at the core of anti-
trust law: collusion among participants toward anticompetitive ends,
and exclusion of participants in the standard or the market opportu-
nities created by it thereafter.' 9
These limits to cooperation, or this detrimental cooperation,
might manifest with any type of technology standard, such as standards
for conduit that holds electrical wiring 20 or lit. underground storage
tanks. 21
 Other categories of creation-process opportunism discussed
below, however, are exacerbated with Software Standards due to soft-
ware's ability (1) to embody several types of intangible rights simulta-
neously; and (2) to deploy information-processing functionality into
commerce, yet keep secret the methods directing such processing.
Recently, the "patent. ambush" problem has attracted much atten-
tion as a specific type of intellectual property rights-clearing concern
for SDO standards. In the prototypical scenario, a conniving SDO par-
ticipant guides a standard toward technology for which it has, or
might soon have, patent rights. Ideally for the conniver, the standard
is approved before the patent or application becomes public. There-
after, the patent provides the possibility of extracting royalty payments
18 Sue discussion of consensus verstis consortia SIJOs, .tupra note 11, para. 2.
19 AserrcuusT HANnliooK, supra nine 16, at 23.
21) See Allied 'rube & Conduit. Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,496-97 (1988)
(discussing steel conduit mantihicturers that packed meeting to vote down approval of
plastic conduit).
21 See Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Jour Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3(1 295, 296-97 (9111 Cir. 1994)
(describing underground storage tank manufacturer that influenced new fire code stan-
dards, essentially making tank liners noncompliant).
20071	 Open Source Licensing & Scattering Opportunism in Softwow Standards	 233
under the threat of injunction. Unless some defense such as unclean
hands is available, this chills development of the standard or makes it
more expensive to implement. Due to the expansion of patentability
in the last decade to cover software in virtually all its forms or applica-
tions, and the flood of dubious patents that followed, the pat-
ent ambush problem is as likely to crop up with Software Standards as
for any other technology.
In contrast to the patent ambush case is a scenario where an SDO
obtains all rights for all participant-controlled intellectual property
covering the standard, including patent rights or copyright in con-
tributed software or other textual materials. Textual materials included
with the standard need intellectual property licenses of appropriate
scope so that implementers can obtain and use these materials when
creating products that embody the standard. if these textual materials
include code examples, a firm's example-inspired implementation of
the standard—even if held private via object code distribution—may
be substantially similar to the example. Holding object code private,
perhaps as a trade secret, points to the last category of creation-
process opportunism.
SDO participants often benefit from their private information
related to a standard. This creates incentives to attempt to influence
the standard in directions favorable to the participant. 22 Assume that
a participant has the lowest-cost manufacturing process to make con-
duits from a particular material at standard-specified hardness, envi-
ronmental tolerances, or uniformity of dimensions. It would prefer
that the standard specify this material. Similarly, an information tech-
nology standard might favor software technologies that give certain
participants a competitive advantage in the post-creation phase.
C. Implementation Opportunism
One post-creation issue applicable to almost all standards is the
possibility of some degree of de jure enactment to force the standard
on an industry. 23 This benefits any groups or firms that have produc-
tion advantages in implementation, control the standard, or lead the
market in products for the standard. Like creation-process opportun-
22 See Roberi Axelrod, Coalition Formation in Standard-Setting Alliances, in THE COMPLEX-
ITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS or COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 90,
99-101 (Robert Axelrod ed., 1997).
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking
and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mien. L. Rix. 291,293-94,330-38 (21105).
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ism, however, implementation opportunism also has scenarios exacer-
bating opportunism for Software Standards. The remainder of this Part
highlights these scenarios using two general labels: over-implementa
tion and uncler-implementation.
The less charitable phrase lbr over-implementation is "embrace,
extend, extinguish." In this gambit, a firm adopts a Software Standard,
embracing it, but adds capability to the standard, extending it. It keeps
that additional capability private using object code, and hopes that its
version of the implementation will become favored and widespread in
the market. This could occur due to technical advantages, network ef-
fects if the firm is a successful first mover on the standard, or a firm's
preexisting market prevalence. 24
 A victorious gambit would extinguish
the original standard.
Under-implementation relates to latent software product inter-
operability needs. Often, software is sold purportedly in compliance
with a variety of standards, but the typical installation will not need
the lull intcroperability derived from all the Software Standards em-
bodied in the software. It is a general truism that most deployed soft-
ware, whether in product- or custom-developed form, contains many
branches of infrequently used functionality. This is in contrast to
standards centering on properties of physical phenomena. These can
often be more exact than data-processing standards, and are more
verifiable by customers before purchasing a product. Interoperability
is more difficult to evaluate and achieve with interacting software clue
to the variety of computing platforms, languages, and protocols in-
volved in the information-technology ecosystem. This makes verifica-
don of the standard implementation more difficult for Software Stan-
dards. Partial or incomplete implementations are not uncommon,
and sometimes are allowed by the standard as a form of technological
compromise. Thus, under-implementation gives lip service to the
standard without supporting it well.
24 See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 E3d 1115, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1999)
(alleging a less than fay compliant implementation of Sun's Java technology); Commis-
sion Decision COMP/(-3/37.792, 2004 0,1. (C 290) II 251-258, at 72-73, available at
htt p://europa.ei
 it/conn/competiiim i/antitrust/ cases/decisions/37792/ en.pdf (find-
ing, in Microsoft case, that a protocol 10 authenticate users fin .
 purposes of granting access
to computing resources had been extended beyond the relevant standard); Mark A. Lens.
ley & David McGowan, Legal Implicalimo of Ndwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. Rix. 479,
485-87, 515-19 (1998) (relating network economic effects to standard setting).
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II. OPPORTUNISM INHIBITING NORMS IN STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
AND FREE AND OI'EN SOURCE SOFTWARE
Because technology standards provide public and private bene-
fits, they are susceptible to opportunistic behavior both during crea-
tion and later during product implementation. One policy response is
norms and a system of enforcement. This Part discusses norm en-
forcement employed to inhibit SDO participant opportunism. It fo-
cuses on the SDOAA's requirements that must be met for its antitrust
law protection to attach, an enforcement mechanism for norms that
helps inhibit opportunism within an SDO. Thereafter, this Part re-
views FOSS norms that perform a similar function.
A. The Backdrop of Competitor Collaboration
The SDOAA's protection descends from two sources. First, the
general tension between the procompetitive and anticompetitive ef-
fects of competitor collaboration raised the perceived need to facili-
tate restrained forms of such collaboration. 25 Second, as a specific ex-
ample of the first source, antitrust law's special status for joint ven-
tures preceded the SDOAA and provided a framework for it.
For standards, the procompetitive effects center on uniformity,
quality, interoperability, safety, and other attributes that support, im-
prove, or enable the markets related to products embodying the stan-
dard. For joint ventures, the positive effects arise from combining re-
search or production assets, at least from the perspective of the
SDOAA's precursor laws, which first de-trebled damages for registered
research joint ventures and provided rule of' reason treatment regard-
less of registration, and later extended that framework to production
joint ventures. 26 Notably, the production joint venture provisions do
not protect marketing or distribution, reflecting a traditional, goods-
25 The potential benefits of competitor collaboration have long been recognized by
the antitrust enforcement agencies. Relatively recently, however, the agencies promulgated
the Collaborations Among Competitors Guidelines, expressing a framework to evaluate
the relative merits and demerits or competitor collaborations. Erc R U.S. DEI"T OF JUS-
TICE., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), avail-
able at littp://www.ftc.govios/2000/04/11cdniguidelines.pdf.
26 The SDOAA amends the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 , 
Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat, 117, which amended the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. !i8-462, 98 Stat. 1815: renamed it the National Cooperative Research
and Production Act of 1993; and extended its provisions to joint ventures for production,
SDOAA, Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 101-108, 118 Stat. 663 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-
4305 (Stipp. IV 2004)).
236	 Boston Coliege Law Review	 MA. 48:225
based view of the production cycle. 27 Collaborative standards devel-
opment aggregates intangible assets rather than physical production
resources. The antitrust issues are similar, but the paradigm to facili-
tate production of a standard is different from the input combina-
dons involved in a traditional goods-based production process.
B. Norms for Consensus Standards: The Standards Development
Organization Advancement Act.
Although industry-generated standards always have been impor-
tant to the U.S. economy, the SDOAA enactment explicitly recognized
the increasing importance of standards in high technology fields. But
the enactment was not willing to grant de-trebled damages and rule of
reason treatment for any SDO intending to develop a standard. The
Act incorporated a set of normative requirements that the SDO must
meet to qualify for such protection by referencing an Office of Man-
agement and Budget Circular from 1997 (the "Circular" ). 28 The Cir-
cular was written to direct federal agencies, as purchasers, to use con-
sensus standards rather than promulgate their own. The Circular,
however, only authorized the use of consensus standards developed
under open, inclusive, and participatory processes.
Thus, to qualify under the SDOAA, an organization needs "attrib-
utes of openness, balance of interests, clue process, an appeals process,
and consensus."29 When adhered to, these normative process require-
ments reduce opportunism when compared to an organization without
such process. Nevertheless, public choice theory teaches that opportun-
ism is still possible within the normative processes themselves.
The Act and the Circular broadly describe the SDOAA norms. An
SDO qualifying for protection under the Act "plans, develops, estab-
lishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards using procedures
that incorporate" the attributes fisted above in a manner consistent
with the Circular. 3° The Circular recites the first four open-process
attributes without additional explanation, but provides an expanded
definition for consensus. It defines consensus as:
[G]eneral agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, [includ-
ing] a process for attempting to resolve objections by inter-
ested parties, as long as all comments have been fitirly con-
27 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (b) (1) (2000).
28 Sre generally OMB CIRCULAR, SUM note 11.
29 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (8) (Supp. IV 2004).
u Id.
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sidered, each objector is advised of the disposition of his or
her objection (s) and the reasons why, and the consensus
body members are given an opportunity to change their votes
after reviewing the comments. 31
The SDOAA seeks generally to inhibit opportunism under the sell=
evident theory that an open process enables participants to check each
other, each having available the threat of involving antitrust authorities
or antitrust law against the others. Enforcement of the SDOAA's norms
is inherent in its scheme, and relies on the desirability of de-trebled
damages and the Act's other protections for the SDO.
Several aspects of the Act's language, operation, and use are rele-
vant to note. In the SDOAA's findings section, Congress provided six
points of additional context for the open-process attributes given in the
Circular: (1) notice to affected parties, (2) opportunity to participate,
(3) non-domination by any group through balanced interests,
(4) access to information, (5) substantial agreement required for all
material points after airing all views and objections, and (6) voice rights
followed by consideration and appeal." Such open processes may di-
minish a participant firm or interest group's ability to skew the stan-
dard toward its preferences. These process requirements, however, do
not necessarily lead to effective rights-clearing methods for intangible
rights.
Under SDOAA norms, factions are better enabled to counterbal-
ance attempted standard-skewing, and their use helps to clear intan-
gible rights. The more direct approach, however, is to incorporate the
following processes into the SDO: (1) disclosure of such rights;
and/or (2) allocation and licensing of the rights, once known. The
SDOAA alludes to this goal." Its definition of "standards develop-
ment activity" includes "actions relating to the intellectual property
policies" of the SDO. 34 This could include intellectual property dis-
closure requirements, but the Act itself does not specify. Rather, a
House report suggests the intent to promote such disclosure. 35 Dis-
51 OMB CIRCULAR, s upra note 11, § 4(a) (1)(v).
32 SDOAA§102(5)(A)—(F).
33 Report and Recommendations on H.R. 1086 Standouts Development aganization Advance-
ment Ad, 2003 A.B.A. SLtc. ANTrrRusT L. REP. 17-18, available at Intp://www.ahanet.org/
an ti trust/at-coin men ts/ 2003/11-03/ncrpa.pdf.
15 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (7).
55 See 1-1.R. RFT, No. 108-125, pt. 2, at 1 (2003), as reprinted in 2004	 651,
051 (amending prior version of report and stating, "The Act seeks to encourage disclosure
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cussing licensing in the SDO, however, creates a potential dilemma:
arc licensing terms an intellectual property policy, or does such dis-
cussion constitute the prohibited exchange of information "relating
to cost, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of any
product, process, or service that is not reasonably required for the
purpose of developing or promulgating a voluntary consensus stan-
dard"? 36 The Act gives little guidance on how to resolve this tension.
With its oblique-at-best support for intellectual property rights-
clearing processes, the SDOAA does not presage any particular
method to unearth and clear rights. Nor does it provide clear protec-
tion for SDOs that discuss and set licensing terms. Enforcement for
abuses with intangible rights still relies on antitrust law, but also de-
pends on other law bearing on the SDO's defined processes fbr such
rights, including contract law, state unfair competition law, and other
areas.
The SDOAA provides broad norms for general behavior and vague
protection for actions supported by intellectual property rights, all en-
forced under antitrust law. A longer treatment than this Article would
discuss one of the other overarching norm examples, such as the
American National Standard Institute's SDO accreditation require-
ments, which provide greater detail for handling intellectual property
rights. 37
 The SDOAA example, however, has a unique status due to its
location in antitrust law. But. the greater point is the presence of norms,
and related enforcement mechanisms, to limit opportunism. 38
by intellectual property rights owners of relevant intellectual property rights and proposed
licensing terms." (emphasis omitted)).
See 15 U.S.C. § 4301(c) (1) (Stipp. IV '2004).
37 See Am. NAT'L. STANDARDS INST., ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS RNUIRE-
MENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL. STANDARDS § 3.1, at 9 (2(06) (describing requirement
for royalty-free or RAND liceitsing of any patents inchuied in a standard).
38
 The discussion of SDOAA norms raises a question beyond the scope of this Article:
would a FOSS group developing software qutalllg for the SDOAA's protection? FOSS devel-
opment projects are riot homogenous, so a case-by-lase approach would be necessary to
evaluate the query. Under a plain meaning of the term, software development does not
seem like "standards development." The traditional conception of a technical standard
'night include software interoperability information, but does not include operable soft-
ware code, except for the special case of a software product becoming a de facto standard.
Standards in the inforination technology sector sometimes come with reference imple-
mentations, such as example software showing one approach to using the standard. But
this is not always the case.
FOSS development also falters, however, compared to the SDOAA's open process at-
tributes, in that it does not necessarily guarantee due process, an appeals process, or vont ig
in the sense meant by the Circular's definition of consensus. Notice, opportunity to par-
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C. Norms in FOSS Development
Enforcing FOSS norms starts with the FOSS license requirements
for available source code, royalty-free use, and other provisions de-
signed to perpetuate these two ideals." But a variety of other norms
supports FOSS, including norms that engender source code contribu-
tions and collaboration to generate the software. The force of a license
is not directly behind these other norms, except perhaps for the influ-
ence of the "right to fork" inherent in the license structure, which al-
lows a dissatisfied subgroup of the original group to take its own path
with the software. Rather, contribution and collaboration norms de-
pend on a potent ideology and, increasingly, strategic factors in com-
puting.
Given the overlapping approaches shared by SDOs and FOSS for
clearing intellectual property rights, it is worth noting that FOSS de-
velopment shares many of the open-process attributes referenced by
the SDOAA. 40 These attributes are inherent in the licensing scheme.
The code is available and everyone is working with the code, even us-
ers who contribute only by extending the user base.'"
Enforcement of the norms embodied in a FOSS license flows
from its adoption by a software project. 42 By its terms, the license's
ticipate, and access to information are all high with most FOSS development, but an inner
circle or founding group of developers often has primary clout for key design decisions,
" See supra note 2.
40 See Cargill, .supra note 11. at 33-36; see also Standaelt-Setting and United States Competitive.
tress: Hewing &fore the Subromm. un Envt, Tech, and Standings of the IL. Science Comm., 107th
Cong. 3 (2001) (mentioning, in the context of a discussion of standards in the global econ-
omy, FOSS as a factor influencing the trend toward vendor-neutral standards).
11 STEVEN WEISER, Tin,. SUCCESS Or OPEN SOURCE 153-54 (2004).
12 In its history, FOSS has several examples of public license evaluation mechanisms. At
the time of this writing, a particularly prominent process is just underway: the GPI, revision.
One way to understind the GPL revision process is that it attempts to take a de facto stan-
dard—GPL Version 2 dating from 1991—and adorn it with de jute or consensus status
through the public input process associated with discussion drafts issued during the process.
See Free Software Foundation, Inc., GNU General Public License (Discussion Draft I of Ver-
sion 5, 2006), http://gply3.1sf, org/gpl-draft-2006-01-16,Imul; Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
GPLv3 First Discussion Draft Rationale 1-2, 5, 21 (2006), littp://gplv3.fsforg -/gpl-rationale-
2006-01-16.pdf, A series of discussion drafts was released to generate comments on proposed
modifications to the GPL.
This revision process, however, is similar to FOSS sollware-development processes evalu-
ated against the SDOAA in Af Ora note 38: notice, infOrmation, and participatory opportunities
are high, but the ultimate decision is not necessarily the result of voting or consensus. See Free
Software Foundation, Inc., GPI.,v3 Process Definition, at iii–iv, 3, littp://gplv3.fsforg/process-
definition (follow "Download as a PDF" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (stating that
although submitted comments will be reviewed and associated with identified issues, substan-
tive revisions arising from the comments are at the discretion of the revisers).
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provisions persist through successive generations of the software. An-
other mode of enforcement is also in play: several FOSS license au-
thors, including the GPI, author, actively assert copyright in the li-
cense. Although a copyright in such works might be thin, the asser-
tion itself may facilitate uniformity et -Abu-cement for the license by
inhibiting close variants.
This Part's norm enforcement discussion centers on the license in
FOSS and on antitrust law under the SDOAA for SDOs, but these ideas
converge for Software Standards where the FOSS approach suggests a
substitute mechanism to inhibit opportunism. It requires source code
disclosure and royalty-frce use, which are analogous to boundary ma-
nipulation to inhibit opportunism in historical se ► icommons property
regimes. The next Part elaborates.
III. STANDARD OUTPUT STRUCTURE, TECHNOLOGICAL.
BOUNDARIES, AND OPPORTUNISM
As demonstrated in Part I, standard setting and implementation
raise conflicting incentives. Participants who can skew a standard to
their favor may seek private gain at the expense of the common bene-
fits of greater standardization, or participants may merely position
themselves for the most advantageous commercial opportunities pro-
vided by the standard. A favorable position might come from competi-
tive advantages with standard-mandated technology, or the potential to
charge for or leverage the intellectual property rights in the standard.
In this regard, a standard is analogous to a semicommons prop-
erty regime, such as the open fields system surrounding a village in
historical England. The private use occurs on unenclosed strips scat-
tered throughout the open fields. Individual landowners have rights
in the strips for agriculture, typically "owning" a small number of scat-
tered strips. The public use is communal animal grazing on the com-
mon areas and strips. The animals, such as sheep, can both help the
agriculture through manure left on the land and damage it by tram-
pling the soil. 43 The figure in Appendix A shows a sample map of the
On the other hand, a form license offered to all to use is more like a voluntary con-
sensus standard than the software output of a FOSS development team. Furthermore,
FOSS license generation via collaborative processes may fit within the statutory language
that defines "intellectual property policies" as standards-development activity. Thus, com-
pared to FOSS development, a public input process for FOSS license revision or genera-
tion seems to have a greater chance to quality for the SDOAA's protection.
' 13
 See Smith, supra note 4, at 132.
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open fields system.'" The shading represents scattered holdings among
the landowners.
Recent scholarship theorizes this historical semicommons property
to identify the substitutable role of norms and their compliance versus
manipulation of property boundaries to abate strategic behavior coun-
terproductive to the semicommons regime:15 The relative benefits and
costs of each alternative influence whether one predominates or a
mixed regime results. Under this view, there is a structural inclination
for boundary revision over monitoring For norm compliance when
(1) the social benefits of opportunism abatement from new boundaries
that disperse a participant's possibility for private gain at the expense of
the common use outweigh the social costs of restructuring boundaries,
and (2) this benefit/cost assessment is more advantageous than its
norm compliance counterpart:16
The practical implementation of this framework is a preference
for scattered strips over norm monitoring in the open Field system.
Scattering irregular-shaped strips owned by individual landowners
makes it difficult for an owner to direct trampling damage to other
owners' plots and garner all the benefits of nighttime foldage—the
right to manure animals leave on the land. The alternative structure is
for each landowner to own one contiguous plot rather than scattered,
irregular-shaped strips. The scattered strips are a form of boundary
manipulation inhibiting opportunism that seeks private benefit at the
expense of the common good and other landowners. If the owner has
44 The example figure in Appendix A is from the Shropshire Routes to Roots project,
whose web site is at http://www.shropshireroots.org.uk (last visited Oct. 12, 2006), The
direct link to the images describing the Open Fields of Sheinton is at http://www3.
shropshire-cc.gov.uk/roots/packages/lan/lan y05.htnt (last visited Oct, 12, 2006). The
figure in Appendix A is from Figure 9 on the Open Fields page, which uses "glebe terriers"
(a document that lists the property hek1 by an incumbent) to reconstruct the historical
holdings. Sheinton Open Fields System 1747, at fig.9, hitpt//www3.shrops1iire-cc.gov.uk/
roots/images/lan_141ajpg (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). The author thanks his student re-
search assistant, Nivine Zakhari, for communicating with the Routes to Roots project to
secure permission to reprint this image,
The image in Appendix A is reprinted with permission front Dr. Trevor C. Hill, the
copyright holder. Dr. Hill also asked that these annotations note that "these maps are
based upon an original manor map—Shropshire Archives 6802—held on behalf of the
Hon. H. Vane and the details from an analysis of the Survey Book Shropshire Archives
168/2-7."
45 See Smith, supra note 4, at 131-33, 162-64.
46 See id. at 138-46, 161-67. Both the valve of the benefit/cost ratio and the levels of
the benefit and cost will be important in determining which regime is preferred. lknefits
that greatly outweigh corresponding costs may still not be achievable if structural or
startup cost factors make bearing or funding the costs impracticable.
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one plot with regular boundaries, she can herd sheep on paths that
do not cross her land, reducing inopportune trampling, and perhaps
move sheep to her land in the evening for the foldage benefits. Scat-
tered strips thus have a different profile of costs and benefits kir the
owner compared to a contiguous, regularly shaped plot. 47
Applying these concepts to Software Standards, contiguous plots
are analogous to the SDO approach for standard output. Scattered
plots are analogous to FOSS. The move from an SDO to FOSS is a
boundary manipulation in the sense that the benefit/cost profile
changes because FOSS requires royalty-lice disclosure of oftentimes
secret information—the source cock—upon distribution of the soft-
ware. This impacts the standard setters collectively and individually
during both the creation process and later during implementation.
To discuss the implications of manipulating the "boundary" around
standards, this Part reviews the traditional output structure for stan-
dards and then contrasts that with FOSS.
A. SDOs—Public ,Specifications with Oftentimes Private Implementations
The traditional output of a process that creates a standard is com-
municated by a technical document, typically called a specification.
There are numerous ways to taxonomize standards, but they all need
their information published. One broad division for technology stan-
dards is performance versus design. For example, a performance spe-
cification for metal pipes used in household plumbing might specify
the range of water pressure they must tolerate without bursting, or
specify how much they expand or contract within a given temperature
range. Design specifications aimed at the same goals, however, might
specify the pipes' wall thickness and composition. Software Standards
are a mixture of these two. Software design elements, such as data
structures, parameter types, and program flow control, work with per-
formance requirements, such as message throughput, acknowledge-
ment and retry rates, and response time settings. Much of the stan-
dardization work in software is directed toward the goals of interopera-
bility or data exchange. 48 Both design and performance requirements
are important to interoperability. For software, they tend to merge the
division illustrated by the above plumbing pipe example.
The mixed performance/design specification for a Software
Standard guides implementers who program the standard in software
Irl. at 146-52.
48
 Another rmqor goal is uniformity to facilitate software and human capital reuse.
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deployed either in product or custom form. In most situations, the
source code for this software will be held privately because, even if the
software is productized, traditional proprietary software distribution
includes only the object code, from which the source code is not eas-
ily discovered. Thus, the implementation of the standard is obscured.
Direct inspection is not practical. Compliance can be tested in various
technological ways, but the measure of compliance is only as good as
the test, which is rarely complete.
The privately held software for a Software Standard allows over-
implementation and under-implementation, as those terms are used in
Part I. 49 For example, a software vendor might implement a standard so
that its code interoperates with the vendor's own products and third-
party products. But, in this example, the vendor might invest more
heavily in programming or testing compliance when interoperating
with its own products, resulting in poor response times for the interface
with third-party products. A user experiencing these poor response
times may have difficulty pinpointing the problem or assigning causal-
ity to the correct supplier. This situation and other examples of under-
implementation or over-implementation are transparent with the FOSS
approach to Software Standards.
B. FOSS—Public Implementation with Accessible Source Code
if a standard originated as a well-documented, functioning FOSS
program, the private aspects of its implementation would be greatly
diminished. The source code would be available to all under the
FOSS license because the software would likely be distributed. The
program's comments could readily contain sufficient material to ex-
pand the inherent documentation of the standard present in the
source code. In technological respects, the FOSS source code, and
ancillary documents as necessary, can serve the functions of the tradi-
tional standard specification fbr a Software Standard, with its addi-
tional capability as operable code. Several implications result and are
illustrated in the figure below.
49 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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Figure—Revising the Technological Boundary for Software Standards
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flashed-line boxes represent software code, tt Standard Gode R implements the standard
expressed by the FOSS Standard Code. This is to
illustrate the mitt intl possibility of such an im-
plementation, putt lig aside the issue of whether
the FOSS license for this approach would or
should allow it.
First, presumably, the implementers would use the FOSS code in
their products, provided that the FOSS license did not inhibit this.
They would have to distribute or make available the source code im-
plementing the standard, but that should be of little concern if they
received it from the FOSS standard-generation process.
Second, compared to the traditional process, the FOSS approach
has the potential to reduce duplicative standard implementation efTort
and corresponding opportunism. This presupposes that the collective
efforts to generate the FOSS standard implementation are successful.
Whatever collective-action or free-rider problems may exist for FOSS
development generally should not be exasperated in the software-as-
standard context. Even if FOSS has not fully solved these problems, the
problems have not hampered FOSS so as to prohibit its emergence.
FOSS standard development might more readily overcome such prob-
lems because the cooperative practices necessary to create a traditional
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standard will carry over in concept to FOSS and blend with its unique
organizational practices.
Third, the figure illustrates the reuse of the FOSS standard soft-
ware, but also shows the technical possibility of a private implementa-
tion and notes the need for the FOSS license to account for the soft-
ware-as-standard. Technologically, an implementer could opt to treat
the FOSS software as a technical specification document and privately
implement the functionality expressing the standard. The question is
whether the FOSS license should allow this. From a copyright-
infringement perspective, the private implementer would need access
to the FOSS software to learn the standard, and might prOduce a sub-
stantially similar program as to protectable elements. Some FOSS li-
censes view distribution of such a non-literal copy or derivative work
as an action triggering the FOSS license's source code disclosure re-
quirement. Under such a disclosure obligation, the private implemen-
tation becomes public anyway. This disincentive would likely channel
firms to use the FOSS software-as-standard.
To do so, however, the software-as-standard license should consider
disavowing a feature of FOSS's most popular license, the GPL. The
GPL requires other closely intermixed software that might constitute a
derivative work to be licensed yet again under the GPL or equivalent
terms." This would inhibit use of the FOSS software-as-standard be-
cause participants would often prefer to keep their product implemen-
tation secret by distributing only object code for such other software.
Thus, the FOSS license for the software-as-standard should provide a
safe harbor for intermixing with the implementing vendor's product
software.
The final implication noted here is the political economy of
FOSS as a Software Standard from the participants' perspectives.
Treatment of this issue could go well beyond this Article, but the enti-
ties and employees involved in traditional information technology
standard setting are not necessarily aligned with the open source fac-
tion of the FOSS movement that has taken root in some corporations.
Top down, the management of an important participant in a stan-
dards process might be comfortable with the traditional standards ap-
proach, but uncomfortable with the FOSS option. Bottom up, the en-
5° See Greg R. Nrc t ler, "infectious " Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Pmmoting Re-
sistance?, 36 RuToEns 14 53, 129-30 (2005) (discussing the feature or the GPL ofleniimes
referred to as its "viral" characteristic).
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gineers and technologists accustomed to working in SDOs may not be
familiar with FOSS.
These issues are complicated by the diversity of software's ever-
expanding domain. Whereas an Internet company might, from bot-
tom to top, fully embrace a FOSS software-as-standard approach, an
appliance manufacturer might not, even though a device as mundane
as a typical new refrigerator will soon harbor significant standards-
enabled software. The increasing pervasiveness of software impacts
the political economy question. Information technology standard-
setting work is increasingly migrating to consortia. FOSS, like the new
consortia approach to standards, may also be a response to the chang-
ing nature of innovation in information technology.
In sum, rearranging the technological boundary around a Soft-
ware Standard as suggested herein has a variety of implications. These
implications are inherent in the move from the traditional SDO proc-
ess to FOSS. 51
 Using royalty-free public source code as a common im-
plementation of the standard diminishes opportunism hidden within
the object code of private implementations. The next Section of this
Part reviews these effects and some limitations on their reach.
C. Opportunism Scattering Effects and Limitations
If participant firms migrate to FOSS for Software Standards, one
explanation is that., in the aggregate, they anticipate the benefits to
counter the costs in a more favorable way than the traditional SDO
processes that rely in part on monitoring for norm compliance. The
impetus for such a migration could be the emergence of the FOSS
methodology as a cost-altering technique for aggregating creative and
51
 Movement toward the substitutability suggested by this Article can be seen through
a kw examples. First, sonic SDOs are migrating to intellectual property policies having
increasing congruency with FOSS. See 1-.AWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSINC: SOFT-
WARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 298-310 (2005) (discussing, in particu-
lar, the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") patent. license and its high parallelism with
FOSS licensing principles). Second, the Java programming environment, which may be a
de facto standard, recently released smile of its software environment as FOSS following an
earlier call to do so by an influential FOSS advocate. See Therese Poletti, Sun Maw to Make
Some Java Code Open Suture, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, June 27,2005, at 6E; Darryl K. Taft,
Q&A: Raymond Expounds on Open Letter to Sun, McNealy, EV'EEK, Mar. 8,2004, littp://vvww.
eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1544764,00.asp
 (reporting Eric Raymond's arguments that
Sun should consider releasing the Java "reference implementation under an open-source
license").
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technological inputs. 52 Participants might readily give up remunera-
tion for the code implementing the standard provided that they can
still sell their product without disclosing its trade secrets, and the
FOSS software is available to provide the standard functionality. Thus,
the interface between the FOSS software-as-standard and the private
product is important.
Participants could, however, attempt to shift opportunistic im-
plementation into the product code, which might limit the beneficial
effects of FOSS to generate a more uniformly implemented standard.
In other words, an argument against the efficacy of FOSS for Software
Standards is that it merely shifts the strategic behavior to a different
layer in the technology. Whether such problems occur, or how severe
they arc, depends on both technological factors and the political
economy of the FOSS approach in the standard-setting world.
Several issues relate to the political economy question. One is
whether the FOSS approach would attract a smaller number of par-
ticipants, resulting in fewer intangible rights contributed to the stan-
dard through FOSS implementation, and thus a less potent standard.
The FOSS movement is engendering significant rethinking about the
use of intangible rights, particularly patents, leading some major pat-
ent-holding enterprises to dedicate large numbers of patents to roy-
alty-free use in support of FOSS and open standards. Moreover, the
FOSS movement has influenced some SDOs to revise practices con-
cerning royalties for use of a standard. The FOSS movement seeks not
only royalty-free licenses, but licenses that allow free redistribution
without requiring each distributor and recipient to specifically sign an
agreement with the original intangible rights holder.° This is some-
times called "frictionless" redistribution. The explicit agreement re-
quirement provides rights holders indirect leverage and competitive
information. Each of these provisions—frictionless redistribution and
royalty-free use—reduces transaction costs compared to RAND licens-
ing that putatively requires a payment agreement with each licensee,
even assuming that the parties incur no negotiating costs to decide on
the reasonable royalty rate." Despite whatever transaction cost advan-
52 see
 lienklcr, .supra note 6, at 372-78: Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The D(711.5CiZ
Thesis and. the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 . 1. LEGAL. S't'un. 331,334-35 (2002) (discussing
the possibility of suloup costs impeding the emergence of new systems of property rules).
55 WEBER, SUpin note 41, at 85-86,101-62,228 (characterizing FOSS as embodying a
new conception of property as a right to distribute).
51 Concern varies over the degree of difficulty to arrive at a RAND royalty rate. See.
Miller, supra note 15, at 2-3,6 (collecting sources and arguing that the RAND promise is
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tages might attach to frictionless redistribution, FOSS's requirement
for that novel approach could limit firms' taste for the FOSS ap-
proach to Software Standards.
These issues, however, should not obscure the overarching bene-
fits of public source code embodying the standard. This transparency
inhibits over- and under-implementation of the standard. During
standard production, participants may limit strategic behavior antici-
pating this future transparency. Even with this benefit, however, the
FOSS approach to Software Standards can do no better than SDOs for
undiscovered or undisclosed third-party patent rights covering the
standard. But the FOSS approach's structural characteristics suggest
that it might deemphasize path dependency constraints on standard-
izing technology and evolving those standards. 55
This potential result is because the FOSS license allows anyone to
"fork" the implementation—to start independently down a different
path with the Software Standard. The right to fork can cut both ways. It
helps inhibit opportunism through the threat of exit fi -om the FOSS
development group, and can enable the standard to escape more easily
a suboptimal equilibrium in a technological sense. But forking raises a
fragmentation risk for the standard-implementing software, although a
similar risk is present with traditional standards through over-
implementation to "embrace, extend, and extinguish" the standard.
One difference between the FOSS and SDO systems is the FOSS ap-
proach of free, or "frictionless," redistribution, which means royalty-Free
with a decentralized permission to use. Along with source code avail-
ability, these are the cornerstone characteristics of FOSS and the rea-
sons why it proposes an intriguing alternative for Software Standards.
CONCLUSION
All standards face the possibility of counterproductive strategic
behavior. Standards expressed in functioning software face unique
forms of opportunism from implementations held private through ob-
ject code. Traditional standard-development organizations often im-
plement processes to monitor and enforce norm compliance to pro-
duce balanced, open standards. These processes can include methods
to disgorge and clear intangible rights, such as participants' patent
rights. FOSS norms equivalently operate through its unique licensing
not so underspecified its to be inachninistrable, bu t that it provides a guarantee of access
critical to allowing coalescence around a technology).
55 WEintlt, SUpia note 41, at 235-41.
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structure, requiring royalty-free software with source code through suc-
cessive generations of the code. For standards implemented in soft-
ware, FOSS offers an alternative approach for standard generation that
bypasses the traditional specification document in favor of functioning
code. Various advantages and disadvantages result, including a trans-
parent implementation with opportunism-inhibiting effects from the
available source code and the characteristics of FOSS licensing.
APPENDIX A
